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Full text of "Rapid Population Growth Consequences And Policy Implications"

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the needs of older citizens. Now that older people are less likely to live with their children, they are increasingly in need of their own housing, facilities for social recreation, and, above all, state-financed medical facilities. Responsibilities once borne by children are now increasingly being borne by the state through systems of social security.
In considering the structure of a population and its political effects, it is necessary to distinguish between the political role of a particular age group when it constitutes a small portion of the population and its role when its numbers have sharply increased. The young, for example, may be more innovative, more liberal, and more radical than their elders, but they may not be politically active unless they are numerically large. Similarly, a small, conservative, elderly population may be ignored by politicians, but beyond a certain size threshold, it may become a target of competing politicians, as has been the case in California, Florida, and Arkansas. In the 1968 presidential elections in the United States, Senators McCarthy and Kennedy explicitly sought the support of young age groups, just as Mr. Nixon sought the support of middle-aged citizens, and as, 4 years earlier, Mr. Goldwater sought the support of older citizens. In short, in the study of political demography it is not only important to examine the size of different age groups in the population and their attitudes and behavior, but we must also consider the perceptions of politicians as to the importance of certain age groups as constituents.
Political Effects of Changes in Family Size
Though the ideal of the extended multigenerational family is found in most traditional societies, it is during the period of demographic transition that this ideal becomes a reality. In a period of demographic transition, there are fewer infant mortalities, fewer maternal deaths, and an increase in longevity which results in the survival of parents and grandparents. Families have both more children and more adults, frequently extending over several generations.
How large do families become during periods of demographic transition when mortality rates have declined but fertility rates have not? Clark, surveying a large number of studies, reports that of women born from 1870 to 1879 in Brazil, total fertility (excluding childless women) was 7.5 births per woman, among Jamaican women born between 1844 and 1923 it was 5.4, in the United States (1800) it was 5.8, in Japan (1868) somewhere between 6.5 and 7.3. At various times in the 19th century, total fertility for Norwegian women reached 6.5, for British women 6.1, and for German women 5.5.
Among contemporary developing countries, total fertility for completed families was 4.8 in Ceylon (1946), 6.35 in China (1934), 6.4 for Mexico (1960), 7.4 for Brazil (1940), 6.2 for Egypt (1956), 6.5 for Senegal (1965), 6.5 for the Philippines (1950), 5.6 for Indonesia (1955), 6.7 for Singapore